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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN PAUL VAROZ, a mmor 
appearing by and through ~ 
BENIGNO VAROZ, his guardian 
ad litem, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DONALD D. SEVEY, Administrator 
of the estate of RONALD F. SEVEY, 
deceased, and SALT LAKE COUNTY , 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
Case No. 
12956 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action filed on behalf of a minor for the wrong-
ful death of his mother, who was a passenger in a vehicle 
driven by Ronald F. Sevey, whose estate is a co-defendant. The 
accident occurred March 5, 1971, when the automobile driven 
by Sevey failed to negotiate a turn on Second West Street near 
3900 South in Salt Lake County, Utah; ran off the highway, 
over-turned and the occupants received injuries from which 
they died. 
1 
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court, following a review of affidavits and legal 
memoranda submitted on behalf of the parties, granted the 
Motion of Salt Lake County, to Dismiss as to it because the 
plaintiff had failed to comply with the notice provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Salt Lake County requests this Court to affirm 
the Judgment of Dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mary Patricia Varoz, the minor's mother, was riding as 
a passenger in a car driven by Ronald F. Sevey on March 5, 
1971. The vehicle, which was proceeding southerly on 2nd 
West Street in Salt Lake County, failed to negotiate a turn 
near 3900 South Street. The car ran off the road, over-turned 
and Miss Varoz and Mr. Sevey both died of injuries. 
A claim was not filed with Salt Lake County until De-
cember 7, 1971. The claim was denied for the reason that it 
was not filed within the 90 day period required by Section 63-
30-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
The usual investigation was made of the accident by 
officers of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department. Because 
a fatality was involved and there was evidence that Sevey was 
under the heavy influence of alcohol at the time of the accident, 
Donald Sawaya, a Deputy County Attorney, conducted an in-
vestigation under the provisions of Section 26-20-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 19 5 3. This Section requires the County At-
2 
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torney or his deputy to investigate any human death occurring 
within the county, where death is not caused by a readily 
recognizable disease, disability or infirmity and where there is 
a reasonable possibility of criminal action. An analysis of 
Sevey's blood showed an alcohol content of 0.22%. Since 
Sevey did not die until one week following the accident, there 
app'.:'ared a reasonable basis for charging him with a crime in-
volving automobile homicide ( R. 20). 
Robert Goicoechea, an attorney, was employed on behalf 
of the plaintiffs to represent their interests. He apparently 
undertook some inquiry into the matter on May 24, 1971 
(App. Brief p. 4). He claims to have had a telephone conver-
sation with "an employee of Salt Lake County Highway De-
partment" on or about May 24, 1971. He was allegedly told 
that the street where the accident occurred was maintained by 
the State of Utah (R. 41). However, he does not identify the 
employee by name or title. A notice of claim was filed with 
the State Road Commission on October 18, 1971, which was 
denied because the street was not maintained by the State of 
Utah ( R. 42). A notice of claim was filed with Salt Lake 
County on December 7, 1971, which was denied because it was 
not timely (R. 42). 
LaMont Gunderson, Director of County Highways, for 
Salt Lake County, stated that it was the policy of his office and 
employees of the County Highway Department to refer in-
quiries regarding ownership and maintenance of streets in the 
County to the office of the County Surveyor, who has on file 
the official plats showing highways and streets over which the 
County has control. He further testified in his affidavit that 
no inquiry was made of him on or about May 24, 1971, the date 
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on which Mr. Goicoechea claims to have made such an inquiry, 
and that his investigation reveals no such inquiry having been 
made by any employee of his department (R. 24). Further, 
had such an inquiry been made, no employee of the County 
Highway Department would have been authorized to respond 
to such an inquiry, other than to refer such inquiring person to 
the County Surveyor. 
Mr. William J. Wilson indicates in his affidavit that he 
has been employed in the Permit Department of the Salt Lake 
County Highways since 196 5; that frequent inquiries are made 
of his department concerning the ownership and control of the 
highways, and that as a routine matter such inquiries are di-
rected to the Salt Lake County Surveyor's Office where this 
information is accurately retained and recorded. No inquiry was 
made of him or of any employees in his department on or 
about May 24, 1971, by any person regarding the ownership 
or maintenance of Second West Street near 3900 South. (R. 
26-27). 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's statement that the death of Mary Patricia Varoz 
was cau:>ed by the failure of Salt Lake County to warn of the 
curve and to construct and maintain guard rails on the curve, 
is wholly conclusionary and without any foundation. It over-
looks the fact that there was a guard rail on the curve, and 
further, that Sevey was heavily intoxicated. Additionally, the 
statement does not have a proper place for consideration in 
this appeal, because the merits of the case are not before the 
court, but rather a review of the legal sufficiency of the lower 
court's urder of dismissal. 
4 
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POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM WAS BAR-
RED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT TIMELY FILED 
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 63-30-13, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act of 1953, Section 
63-30-13, provides as follows: 
"A claim against a political subdivision shall be 
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within 
ninety days after the cause of action arises; provided, 
however, that any claim filed against a city or incorpo-
rated town under section 63-30-8 shall be governed by 
the provisions of section 10-7-77, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953." 
"A political subdivision" is defined m Section 63-30-2, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as: 
" ( 2) ... any county, 
Section 63-30-3 provides: 
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
act, all governmental entities shall be immune fr?~ 
suit for any injury which may result from the act1v1-
ties of said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the 
exercise and discharge of a governmental function." 
The plaintiff admits that a timely filing of notice was 
not made. A notice was not filed until nine months following 
the accident, six months beyond the time provided in the Sec-
tion. 
5 
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In urging this Court to reverse the trial court's judgment 
of dismissal, appellants have failed to refer to the recent case 
of Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 U.2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 
( 197 2), which appears controlling in this case. 
There the plaintiff, who was two years old, was injured 
] uly 1, 1966. A notice of Claim was not filed with the City 
of Midvale until seven months later on February 26, 1967. 
The District Court granted summary judgment as to defendant 
Midvale City on the grounds that notice of the claim had not 
been given to the City within thirty days as required by Sec-
tion 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated. 
The plaintiff claimed that because the injured child was 
only two years old, she should not be barred from bringing her 
action because of the failure to comply with the applicable 
thirty day notice provision. The court rejected this argument. 
The court pointed out that even if the area where the minor 
plaintiff was injured were not a part of the city street, as con-
tended, " ... and thus not governed by Section 10-7-77, it 
would be governed by the Waiver of Governmental Immunity 
Act, Chap. 139, S.L.U. 1965. Under Sec. 13 thereof, (Sec. 63-
30-13, U.C.A., 1953) the claim would have had to be filed 
within 90 days, so the plaintiff's claim would have been filed 
much too late." 
The requirement for filing a notice of claim within 90 
days could not have been more clearly written. Notice must be 
"filed" within ninety days after the cause of action arises or 
it will be forever barred. The requirement of timely filing by a 
minor (age eight years) , as a prerequisite to recovery in a 
court action, was earlier determined in Hurley v. Town of Bing-
6 
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ham. 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924), and cited in the 
Gallegos case by the Court. The Court was urged in Gallegos 
to overrule the Hurley doctrine. In response to that request, 
the court stated: 
"Nevertheless any contemplated change in the 
decisional law requires due consideration for the values 
of the doctrine of stare decisis. One of the primary pur-
poses and the most important attributes of the law is 
that there be a system of rules which have solidarity and 
continuity so that people can know what the law is and 
place reliance thereon and govern themselves accord-
ingly. For these reasons the law should not be changed 
except for persuasive reasons and when it is clear that 
there has been a plain and obvious error." 
The appellant suggests that the result should be different 
when some agents of government have knowledge of the cir-
cumstances of the incident giving rise to the claim. However, 
the great majority of jurisdictions considering this question 
have held otherwise. Actual knowledge of officials of the 
governmental entity of the facts required to be stated in a 
claim against the entity, does not dispense with the necessity 
of filing a proper and timely claim. 
See Schaefer v. City and Council of Athens, 120 Ga. App. 
301, 170 S.E. 2d 339 ( 1969); Cochran v. City of Sumter, 242 
S.C. 382, 131 S.E. 2d 153 (1963); Allen v. Los Angeles City 
Bd. of Ed., 343 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1959); Cavagnol v. City of 
Orangetown, 17 Misc. 2d 943, 185 N.Y.S. 2d 720 (Sup. Ct. 
1959); Thompson v. City of Shelby, 323 P.2d 33 (Mont. 
1958); Howell v. City of Hutchinson, 177 Kan. 722, 282 P.2d 
373 (1955); Kelley v. City of Austin, 268 SW 2d 773 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1954); Hayes v. Chicago Transit Authority, 340 Ill. 
App. 375, 92 N.E. 2d 174 (1950); Johnson v. City of Chis-
7 
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holm, 222 Minn. 179, 24 N.W. 2d 232 (1946); Hall v. City 
of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 198, 120 P.2d 13 (1941); Cole 
v. St. Juseph, 50 S.W. 2d 623 (Mo., 1932); White v. City of 
Nashville, 134 Tenn. 688, 185 S.W. 721 (1916); Pender v. 
City of Salisbury, 160 N.C. 363, 76 S.E. 228 ( 1912); Gribben 
v. Franklin, 125 Ind. 500, 94 N.E. 757 ( 1911). See other cases 
cited in 34 ALR 2d 725. 
A primary purpose for the notice requirement is to in-
form the governmental entity of the monetary amount of the 
claim within the statutory period. Hock/elder v. Los Angeles 
County, 272 P.2d 844 (Cal., 1954). Our own court has ob-
served rhat there is a great difference between presenting no 
claim at all, and presenting a claim which contains a defect. 
Spencer v. Salt Lake City. 17 U.2d 362, 412 P.2d 449 ( 1966). 
In any event, substantial compliance cannot reasonably be 
based upon no compliance. Hall v. City of Los Angeles, S11pra; 
Brigham v. Seattle, 34 Wash. 2d 786, 210 P.2d 144 (1949). 
Plaintiff's claim that the Governmental Immunity Act 
does not create a new cause of action, whereas the provisions 
of Section 10-7-77, U.C.A. (195 3) relating to actions against 
cities and towns does create a new action, is an attempt to dis-
tinguish the two statutory provisions not founded in the law. 
In either case, a suit against a governmental entity cannot be 
maintained unless governmental immunity were waived by 
the sovereign. 
"A party seeking to obtain the benefit of the sec-
tion should not be entitled to claim the favorable as-
pects which confer the rights and disavow the condi-
tions upon which the rights are predicated." Gallegos v. 
Midvale City, 27 U.2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335, 1337 
(1972). 
8 
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The failure of appellant to timely file a notice of claim 
precludes recovery, and the trial court properly dismissed the 
action as to Salt Lake County. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY WAS NOT ESTOPPED 
FROM REL YING UPON THE DEFENSE OF UN-
TIMELY FILING OF NOTICE OF CLAIM. 
Appellant claims that Salt Lake County should be estop-
ped from relying upon the notice requirements of Section 63-
30-13, U.C.A., 1953, because his attorney allegedly made an 
inquiry of some unidentified person in the Salt Lake County 
Highway Department, who informed him that the highway 
where the accident occurred was maintained by the State of 
Utah. 
Appellant relies upon Rice v. Granite School District, 23 
U.2d 22. 456 P.2d 159 ( 1969), but that case is not controlling 
here In Rice, an authorized insurance adjuster, acting for the 
insurance carrier of the school district, made repeated repre-
sentations to the plaintiff that payment would be made of his 
claim which induced the plaintiff to withhold filing beyond 
the 90 day period. 
In the present case the alleged informant is anonymous. 
Employees of the Salt Lake County Highway Department were 
not authorized to make any statement regarding ownership 
or maintenance of county roads. Such inquiries were routinely 
referred to the County Surveyor's Office where accurate infor-
mation was always available. (See Affidavit of Lamont Gun-
9 
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derson, R. 23, 2"1). There is not even a suggestion that the 
unidentified county employee knew the purpose of the attor-
ney's call. Without knowledge as to the purpose of the inquiry 
it cannot be reasonably contended that the employee induced 
the attorney to withhold the filing of a claim. Even so, the em-
ployee could not bind his employer with such a statement be-
cause it was beyond the course and scope of his employment. See 
Preston v. Lamb, 20 U.2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968). The 
Rice court specifically stated that it was not confronted by a 
fact situation where the agent's actions were not authorized. 
The plaintiff in Rice had the right to rely upon the 
repeated assurances of the insurance ad juster that his claim 
would be paid. In the instant case, the inquiry made by Mr. 
Goicoechea was so meager that he did not bother to identify 
the alleged informant, determine his employment position, 
or the basis upon which the statement was allegedly made. For 
all that appears, the conversation was with a telephone re-
ceptionist. There is no evidence of any attempt to verify such 
information by inquiry of an official in the Salt Lake County 
Highw~y Department, or the Surveyor's Office, even though 
full and accurate information was readily available to him and 
the public generally. 
The appellant has listed the elements of estoppel without 
any attempt to explain or apply these principles to the fact 
situation in the instant case. See Appellant's Brief, p. 15, citing 
28 Am. fur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 35. But as will ap-
pear, appellant has not brought the case within the key prin-
ciples which he claims are controlling here. 
10 
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Element 1. "Conduct which amounts to a false repre-
sentation or concealment of material facts or at least which 
' ' 
is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are other-
wise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subse-
quently attempts to assert." 
In proof of this element the appellant apparently alleges 
that the plaintiff's attorney made an inquiry of an employee 
of the County Highway Department who informed him that 
the highway was maintained by the State of Utah. However, 
as stated by the same text writer upon which he relies, an 
estoppd cannot arise from a representation if it was "not in-
tended to have the effect claimed." 28 Am. fur. 2d Estoppel 
and Waiver, Sec. 45, at p. 653. The appellant does not sug-
gest that the unidentified employee even knew the purpose of 
Mr. Goicoechea's inquiry. 
It should also be noted that "Mere general carelessness 
or neglect of what would be prudent in respect of the in-
terests of the party claimed to be estopped is not sufficient, 
... " to establish this element. 28 Am. fur. 2d, Estoppel and 
Waiver. Sec. 61, p. 684. 
Element 2. " ... the intention, or at least the expecta-
tion, that such conduct will be acted upon by, or influence, the 
other party or other persons." 
There is no suggestion in the pleadings or in the affidavits 
filed by the appellant that the representation upon which plain-
tiff's attorney claims to have relied was made with the inten-
tion, or even the expectation that appellant's conduct would 
be changed or even influenced. At best, the employee's state-
11 
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ment was one of general information. Unless the employee 
knew the purpose of the inquiry, intent to induce specific ac-
tion cannot be found. An "admission or statement will not 
work an estoppel if it was addressed to, and designed solely 
for, the information of another, and was not intended to in-
fluence the conduct of the person who claims the estoppel." 
28 Am. fur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 41, at p. 648. 
Element 3: " ... knowledge, actual or constructive, of 
the real facts." 
Appellant has also failed to sustain his burden of proof 
with respect to this element by offering any evidence to sup-
port it. There is no allegation, or even a suggestion of evi-
dence, that the County employee had knowledge of the "real 
facts" of the situation. Mr. Goicoechea' s Affidavit ( R. 41), 
does not suggest that he advised the employee of the purpose 
of his inquiry, or that the employee knew any of the real facts 
concerning the matter. This is evident from the alleged state-
ment of the employee. 
In addition to the establishment of facts which bring his 
claim within the above principles, appellant must also estab-
lish three additional elements which go to the reasonableness 
of his own action under the circumstances. 28 Am. fur. 2d, 
Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 80, p. 720. 
Element 1: " ... lack of knowledge and the means of 
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question." 
By his own Affidavit Mr. Goicoechea admits that he was 
an attorney employed to investigate the accident (R. 41). He 
had the duty and opportunity to make such inquiries as were 
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necessary under the circumstances to preserve his client's claim. 
A higher standard of inquiry is expected of an attorney than of 
a lay person attempting to investigate events surrounding an 
accident and comply with necessary statutory provisions. The 
record is devoid of any evidence that he lacked the means of 
obtaining accurate knowledge of the truth of the facts which 
he now claims were misrepresented to him. In fact, affidavits 
supplied by Mr. Lamont Gunderson ( R. 23), and Mr. William 
]. Wilson (R. 26) indicate that such information was readily 
available to the public and would have been supplied upon in-
quiry. The County Surveyor's Office maintained accurate plats 
concerning ownership and maintenance of all county roads in 
such fashion as to be readily available to anyone. A "lack of 
diligence by a party claiming estoppel is generally fatal." 28 
Am. ] ur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 80, p. 721. 
Element 2: " ... reliance, in good faith, upon the con-
duct or statements of the party to be estopped;" 
Although plaintiff's attorney alleges that he relied upon 
the supposed statement of the County employee, good faith 
reliance cannot be supported. While the purpose of the inquiry 
may have been clear to Mr. Goicoechea, there is no claim, or 
evidence to support even an inference that the unidentified 
employee knew the purpose or significance of the inquiry, or 
that it was intended to influence his conduct in any way. Cer-
tainly an attorney seeking such vital information is charged 
with the duty of verifying it from readily available sources, or 
to alert the person supplying the information to the purpose 
and importance of the inquiry. "A party may not properly 
base a claim of estoppel in his favor on his own wrongful act 
or dereliction of duty. " 28 Am. fur. 2d, Estoppel and 
Waiver, Sec. 79,p. 719. 
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Element 3: " ... action or inaction based thereon of 
such character as to change the position or status of the party 
claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice." 
Appellant attempts to place the full responsibility for 
failere to make a timely filing of notice of claim with Salt 
Lake County. However, it should be noted that the relation-
ship of an attorney and client is one of agency and the general 
rules of law regarding agency are applicable. A client cannot 
avoid the consequences of the act or omission of his freely 
selected attorney, but is deemed bound by his acts. Lind v. 
W abcish Ry. Co., 3 70 U.S. 626 ( 1962). See also 7 C.J.S., At-
torney-Client, Sec. 67, at p. 850. 
In Attorney v. County of Nassau, 31 App. Div. 2d 761, 
297 N.Y.S. 2d 665 (1969), an attorney sought to relieve his 
failure to file an infant's claim with the proper governmental 
entity, as in the present case. The claim was filed with the 
municipality rather than the county, where he later discovereq 
it should have been filed. The attorney sought the court's 
permission to serve late notice of the claim with the county. 
The court held as a matter of law that failure to serve timely 
notice upon the county within the 90-day period was a fatal 
omission attributable to the attorney. 
Appellant has failed to bring the facts of this case within 
the principles of estoppel and the county is not estopped from 
relying upon the defense of untimely filing of notice of appel-
lant's claim. 
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POINT III 
THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT DO NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS 
PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION 1, 
AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 
L SECTION 2. 
A claim of unconstitutionality was made concerning the 
notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 U.2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972), 
and rejected. In that case a notice was not filed on behalf of a 
two year old child within the thirty day period required by stat-
ute. This court held that the allowance of the claim against the 
city was statutorily created, and a party seeking to obtain the 
benefit of the statute is not entitled to claim the favorable 
aspects which confer the rights, and disavow the requirement 
of timely filing, which is a condition precedent to the mainte-
nance of the action. The Gallegos decision followed the earlier 
decision of Hurley v. Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 Pac. 213. 
Similarly, the Kansas Court in Workman v. City of Em-
poria, 200 Ka. 112, 434 P.2d 849, held that the application 
of a statute requiring a written statement to be filed with the 
City clerk within three months of the accident as a condition 
precedent to an incompetent person bringing an action in the 
courts, does not violate the due process provisions of the Con-
stitution. 
The Indiana Supreme Court has also determined that a 
statutory requirement of timely filing within a 60 day notice 
requirement as a condition precedent to suit against a munici-
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pality, is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or of 
the State Constitution. Touhey v. Decatur, 17 5 Ind. 98, 93 
N.E. 540, Sherfey v. Brazil, 213 Ind. 493, 13 N.E. 2d 568. 
The Utah decision holding that the notice requirement of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not violate the 
equal protection provision of the Constitutions of the United 
States and the State of Utah, is consistent with the guiding prin-
ciples contained in pronouncements of the United States Su-
preme Court. 
In McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners of 
Chicago. 394 U.S. 802, 808 ( 1969), the constitutional stand-
ards of equal protection were summarized as follows: 
"Though the wide leeway allowed the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to enact legislation that 
appears to affect similarly situated people differently, 
and the presumption of statutory validity that adheres 
thereto, admit of no settled formula, some basic guide-
lines have been firmly fixed. The distinction drawn 
by a challenged statute must bear some rational re-
lationship to a legitimate state end and will be set 
aside as violative of the equal protection clause only 
if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of 
that goal. Legislators are presumed to have acted con-
stitutionally even if source materials normally resorted 
to for ascertaining their grounds for action are other-
wise silent, and their statutory classifications will be 
set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify 
them. (Citing cases). With this much discretion, a 
legislature traditionally has been allowed to take re-
form 'one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase 
of the problem which seems to be most acute to the 
legislative mind . . .' " (Citing cases). 
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The notice period procedure is well warranted and recog-
nized as a proper provision in governmental immunity type 
statutes. In Gallegos the court set forth some legislative reasons 
for the notice of claim procedure in this language. 
'This alerts the public authorities so that a proper 
and timely investigation of the claim can be made. De-
privation of the city of an opportunity to make a 
prompt investigation of the particular case, and if any 
defect is found to exist to remedy it; the possibility that 
changes may have occurred in the material circum-
stances; and the carry-over to subsequent city adminis-
trations of responsibility for accidents that may have 
previously occurred, are sufficiently obvious not to re-
quire further elaboration." 
Additional reasons also exist which justify legislative classi-
fication of the government being viewed differently than a 
private tortfeasor. The filing provision also requires the claim-
ant to set forth the amount claimed. Fiscal difficulties of set-
ting and following budgets suggests that the governmental 
entity not only have time to adequately investigate and ascer-
tain the validity of the claims, but also be advised of the 
amounts which can reasonably be expected to be involved. 
Further, public officials have often expressed fears that a 
regime of general tort liability may result in a rash of spurious, 
ill-founded and sham claims being pressed against govern-
mental bodies in the hope that a jury may espouse the "deep 
pocket" theory and reward the injured, but legally undeserving 
claimant_ To some extent the requirement that a timely notice 
of claim be presented serves to weed out frivolous or fictitious 
claims_ Such claims are further discouraged by the require-
ment that the plaintiff, upon filing an action, also file an under-
taking which will, at least in part, provide payment of taxable 
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costs inc:urred by the governmental entity in the action if the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to recover. See 
Section 63-30-19, U.C.A. 1953. 
California's Governmental Tort Liability Act, contains 
similar procedures which are said to serve several purposes: 
"One, to give the governmental entity an oppor-
tunity to settle just claims and two, to permit the en-
tity to make an early investigation of the facts on 
which the claim is based, thus enabling it to work out 
unjust claims and to correct the conditions or practices 
that give rise to the claim." California Governmental 
Tort Liability, Supp., 1969, Van Alstyne, pp. 91-92. 
California courts have consistently held the notice of 
claim requirements as being both reasonable and constitutional. 
See Yonker v. City of San Gabriel, 23 Cal. App. 2d 556, 73 
P.2d 623 ( 193 7); Artukovick v. Astendorf, 21 C. 2d 329, 
131 P.2d 831 (1942); Young v. Ventura County, 39 CA. 
2d 732, 104 P.2d 102 (1940); Concalves v. San Francisco 
Unified School Districts, 166 C.A. 2d 87, 332 P.2d 713 
( 1958). 
It is an established principal of constitutional construc-
tion that the equal protection clause is offended only if the 
classification rests on grounds "wholly irrelevant" to the 
achievement of the State's objective, and if the selection or 
classification is neither capricious or arbitrary, and rests upon 
some reasonable consideration of difference or policy. Harris 
P Tztrnpike Commission, 410 F.2d 1332 (3rd Cir., v. enn. 
1969). 
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The notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Im-
munity Act apply indiscriminately to all persons and deal simi-
larly with all categories of citizens. The provisions do not allow 
for invidious discrimination against particular persons. All per-
sons are afforded the same privileges. 
"Clearly placing local government agencies in a 
classification different from non-governmental entities 
in legislation pertaining to statutes of limitation like-
wise constitutes a reasonable classification." W adeley 
v. County of Los Angeles, 205 CA. 2d 668, 23 C.R. 
154, 157 (1962). 
See also Diaz v. Eden Township Hospital District, 57 
C. 2d 502, 20 C.R. 630 ( 1962), where the court held that 
" ... public agencies, generally speaking, afford a proper sub-
ject for legislative classification." The California Supreme 
Court hds reaffirmed these cases specifically in the recent case, 
Tammen v. County of San Diego, 58 C.R. 249, 426 P. 2d 753 
(1967). 
The case of Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 
Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 ( 1972) cited by appellant, which 
declared a notice requirement in a Governmental immunity 
type statute to be unconstitutional, stands virtually alone. The 
Ohio case of Kra11se v. Ohio, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 274 N.E. 
2d 421 ( 1971 ) , referred to in the Reich decision, does not sup-
port the premise for which it is cited. In Krause the Ohio 
court held that recent amendments to the constitution of that 
state had eliminated the doctrine of governmental immunity 
entirely, which had the effect of nullifying any Notice restric-
tions on suits against the state. This is a vastly different matter 
than declaring unconstitutional reasonable requirements of 
notice as a condition to bringing an action against a state or 
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governmental entity which recognizes governmental immunity. 
In any event a harsh dissent in Reich by Justice Brennan, de-
scribing the majority reasoning as "folksy rationale", 1s per-
tinent. The following is taken from his dissent: 
"The process of judicial repeal of legislative en-
actment set in motion with this decision will run as 
far as judicial caprice will carry it. It will now be the 
fashion for judges to throw out all differentials in 
statutes of limitations . . . There is no limitation, it 
seems to the ingenuity of judges who disagree with 
the legislature. What a pity that the American experi-
ment in self-government has in 200 years fallen upon 
such bad times." 
Our court, as in a great majority of decisions considering 
similar provisions, has held that the filing of a timely notice 
is a prerequisite to court action against a governmental entity. 
Traditionally, the question is not, "Does the court agree or 
disagree with the proffered reasons for the statute?", but 
rather, "Can it be said as a matter of law that the statute is 
capricious or arbitrary in application and has no reasonable 
relationship to a legitimate state end?" 
The reasons for the notice statute are reasonable and are 
not arbitrary or capricious in any degree. 
The principle of stare decisis in this area of the law was 
mentioned specifically in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 U. 2d 
27, 492 P. 2d 1335, 1338 ( 1972): 
"One of the primary purposes and the most im-
portant attributes of the. law_ is that ther~ b~ a system 
of rules which have solidarity and contmu1ty so that 
people can know what the law is and place reliance 
thereon and govern themselves accordingly. For these 
20 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reas~ns the law should not be changed except for per-
suasive reasons and when it is clear that there has been 
made a plain and obvious error." 
The appellant in the instant case was afforded the same 
rights as any other citizen. The failure to comply with the 
notice provision cannot now be laid upon the County or a 
claimed constitutional deficiency of the statute. The cumula-
tive weight of the law, reason and policy, suggest the necessity 
that the legislation be upheld as constitutional in every par-
ticular. 
CONCLUSION 
Compliance with the notice requirements of the Waiver 
of Governmental Immunity Act is a condition precedent to 
maintaining an action in tort against a governmental entity. 
Salt Lake County is not estopped from relying upon the stat-
utory defense of untimely filing of the notice of claim because 
facts necessary to work an estoppel are absent and appellant 
has failed to show that his own action, or those of his attor-
ney, were proper under the circumstances. Additionally the 
notice .requirements of the Act meet the constitutional standards 
required of all legislation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
and MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Salt Lake C aunty. 
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